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Thank you very much for this wonderful and way-too-generous introduction and for the honour 
of being chosen to deliver this important lecture named after such a great economist and public figure 
like Gunnar Myrdal.   
I am going to address three questions in my lecture.  The first, on which I will spend the most 
time because it sets the stage for addressing the other two, is: why in the United States is there much 
less concern for redistribution from the rich to the poor than in Western Europe?  This question is the 
subject of a book written with my colleague, Edward Glaeser, entitled Fighting Poverty in the US and 
Europe: A World of Difference, published in 2004 by Oxford University Press.  My remarks on this 
question are drawn from that book.  The second issue I will address is the difference between 
European welfare states; and the third question that I will address quite briefly is: given these different 
welfare system options, what kinds of choices are offered to new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe?  What kinds of choices do these countries have? 
So let me start with the first question: why does Europe redistribute more?  I want to keep this 
question very general at this stage without going into too much detail about the specifics of various 
redistributive programs.  I want to explain the basic fact that in Europe there is much more concern 
about taking from the rich to give to the poor than there is in the United States.   
In the book we document this fact in detail but I won’t bore you here with a lot of data.  Very 
briefly, the size and composition of government spending in Europe in general is much larger and 
much more targeted toward redistribution than in the United States.  The size of government, namely, 
spending as a per cent of GDP is roughly about 50 per cent in Europe versus 30 per cent in the United 
States.  The size of welfare spending in Europe is close to 20 per cent and even more than 20 per cent 
in some Nordic countries, while it is roughly 10 per cent in the United States.  So there’s a big 
difference in spending, particularly in social spending.  In the history of the US there have been 
periods with the New Deal and the great society in which social spending went up – but, broadly 
speaking, the European welfare state has always grown at a faster rate than the American one.   
Note that one of the largest government-spending items is pensions, and while one might argue 
that pensions are not really redistributing from the rich to the poor but, if anything, they redistribute 
from the young to the old, most pension systems in differing degrees do a bit of both.  You get 
proportionally more if you are poor and old than if you are rich and old, so the pension systems 
indirectly also serve the purpose of redistributing from the rich to the poor.  The European pension 
systems, even though quite different from each other, by and large do more of that type of 
redistribution than the American system.  For instance, the German system is not very redistributive; 
the Swedish system is much more so.  Part of the redistribution goes through the taxation system as 
well:  European tax systems tend to be more progressive than the American tax system.  Therefore the 
American rich pay much lower taxes than the European rich.  Finally, a host of labour market 
regulations in Europe are meant to protect the workers.  One may argue whether these regulations 
really protect the very poor or whether they hinder their entry into the labour market.  That’s a big 
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issue of course which I will not talk much about today but, by and large, the labour market regulations 
are meant – at least it is the intention of the policy makers – to somehow protect the disadvantaged.   
I think it is fair to conclude that Europeans are much more concerned about inequality than 
Americans and they try to do more to correct for inequality and reduce poverty.  Of course we should 
remember that inequality and poverty are not the same – one may be in favour of fighting poverty but 
not inequality per se.  This is a critical policy distinction, but it is not an issue I want to address here.  
Certainly Europeans are concerned about both. 
In the book we go through three possible explanations for why Americans have chosen a very 
different social model than Europeans.  For lack of a better word we classify them into three types: 
purely economic explanations, political explanations and what we call behavioural and sociological 
explanations.   
Let me go through the first type, namely, the economic explanations.  The standard explanation 
is that there is more redistribution in Europe because there is more demand for it.  If there is more 
pre-tax inequality in Europe there is more demand for redistribution because in a democracy, if there 
are lots of people who are poor, they demand more policies to correct for inequality and the political 
system delivers it.  This explanation really does not work because in fact it is the other way around – 
even before taxes and transfers there is more inequality in the United States than in Europe.  Thus, 
even though there is more inequality in the US before taxes there are still fewer policies to correct 
these inequalities in the United States relative to Europe.  One aspect of this is that not only is there 
more inequality of income in general in the United States but there is also more inequality of wages, 
which of course are a part of income, and particularly large differences in average wages and low 
wages in the US.  This limited inequality in European wages relative to the United States has had 
important implications for the smooth functioning of labour markets and technological adoption.  So 
there is no evidence that there is more pre-tax inequality in Europe; in fact there is less.  Moreover, 
despite less inequality to correct for, there is more redistribution in Europe 
The second type of economic argument has to do with social mobility.  The argument goes as 
follows: American poor have more opportunity to rise out of poverty and therefore there is less need 
for redistribution because American society is more mobile and there is more opportunity for people to 
make their own fortune – the self-made men or women in the United States versus the more static 
class-based societies in Europe.  I will return to this issue later on as this is a very important point, but 
for the moment I only want to point out that there is very little evidence that in reality there is more 
social mobility in the US than in Europe.  However, Americans are indeed convinced that there is a lot 
of social mobility in their country, while Europeans don’t think that there is much social mobility in 
Europe.  Therefore, either the Americans are wrong in overestimating how much social mobility there 
is in their society, or Europeans are way too pessimistic about how much European social mobility 
there is.  The Europeans and Americans look at similar societies and the Americans see a lot of 
mobility while the Europeans see a lot of immobility – clearly they cannot both be right.  Since 
economics alone doesn’t take us very far, let us move quickly to a more promising and in many ways 
more interesting topic, namely, political explanations. 
Several economists and political scientists have made the point, which I believe is correct, that 
proportional electoral systems – those in which many parties, even small parties, get represented in the 
legislature – tend to produce more redistributive spending.  In fact, many groups manage to get their 
foot in the door of political representation and demand transfers for those that they represent.  Northern 
European countries have proportional electoral systems, while the United Kingdom and the United 
States have majoritarian systems.  Research by Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Roberto Perotti and 3 
Massimo Rostagno, as well as by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini shows a very strong correlation 
between the degree of proportionality of the electoral system and the size of transfers over GDP.  The 
measures of proportionality used by different authors vary but the correlation is strong. 
The second political point is a fairly obvious but very important fact, namely, that the socialist or 
communist parties did not play a significant role in the United States.  In Western Europe, however, 
socialist and communist parties have had an important role in the birth and growth of the welfare state.  
The question is, of course, why a socialist and communist party did not initially develop in the United 
States, which is an issue I’ll return to later on. 
The third political argument is that in the United States the constitutional system is structured in a 
way that historically has been prone to defend private property against expropriation and 
redistribution.  Until at least the middle of the last century the Supreme Court was a bastion for the 
defence of private property.  One of the most famous rulings of the Supreme Court occurred in 1894 
when the court declared unconstitutional a provision for the introduction of a federal income tax on the 
grounds that it was violating private property.  It took about twenty years and an amendment to the 
Constitution to introduce a federal income tax in the United States in 1916.   
Institutions are chosen by citizens.  So the question is: why did the United States adopt 
institutions that are non-redistributive prone?  Proportional representation in most European countries 
was introduced right after the First World War and it was indeed the result of pressure from the 
growing communist and socialist parties, which at the time were a minority, trying to get a foot in the 
political door.  This was precisely why the United States did not introduce a proportional system.  
Legislators in the United States were afraid of two things: the representation of the (small) communist 
party which existed in the US as well and the representation of various waves of immigrants and racial 
minorities.  In the 1920s and 1930s some cities in the United States introduced proportional 
representation for local elections and in fact we do have some examples of socialist mayors elected in 
some cities and an increasing proportion of black representatives in the cities.  Precisely because of 
that, soon virtually all cities abandoned proportional representation.  Today, the only city in the US 
which has proportional representation in elections is Cambridge, Massachusetts, which is in fact the 
bastion of the American left.   
Now that leads to the next question that has kept people fascinated starting with Marx and Engels: 
why did a strong American communist party never develop?  Marx and Engels were aware they would 
not have had much luck in the United States and they were pessimistic about the possibility of a 
communist revolution or even a strong communist party in the US.  They were right.  One of the 
reasons for this, already understood by Engels, is the racial fragmentation of the United States.  The 
United States is a county of immigrants and the different waves of immigrants settled in the US – sort 
of next to each other.  If you were the latest immigrant you were viewed by other workers to be as 
much of an enemy as the business community.  If you were an Irish worker who arrived with the first 
wave of immigration, the second wave, say of Italians, was viewed by Irish workers as enemies, and 
that precluded class solidarity.  
The second reason is economic opportunity.  The United States was a country with an open 
frontier in the west and the pressure of poverty in the eastern cities and rural areas could be decreased 
by migration to the west.  The open frontier was a way for people to find their fortunes.  The same was 
not true in Europe – no open frontier existed for residents of cities such as Brussels or Paris.  The 
openness of the western frontier created a lot of economic opportunities for American immigrants to 
move in that direction and relieve social tension.  Related to this issue is the density and size of the 
United States.  In the nineteenth century, while fairly densely populated cities in the European 4 
countries saw the birth of socialist and communist ideas, the US was instead an open country with 
distantly-spaced cities, which reduced the opportunity to organize working parties.   
The role of wars is also extremely important.  Both the First and Second World Wars were 
catastrophes that created much misery and destruction in Europe and also proved to be the birthplace 
of the communist party.  First, the social cohesion of the armies created fertile grounds for communist 
ideas.  Also, the wars themselves weakened the armies that were not able to suppress potential 
insurrections.  The United States had never lost a war against an outside power and particularly not a 
war fought on its own territory.  The US did experience the catastrophe of the Civil War from which 
there were long-lasting political repercussions, but in the last century did not experience either world 
war on its territory. 
In Europe, socialist and communist parties developed strong ties with the trade unions, both 
ideologically and in terms of political strategy and political action.  The trade unions in the United 
States have a very different role than the European trade unions.  American trade unions are now 
weaker but throughout history even when they were more powerful they had much less of a public role 
than European unions.  American trade unions saw their role as one of bargaining with their 
counterparts in the business community for higher wages or better working conditions.  They never 
saw the government as an ally and American history shows that the government was not an ally of the 
unions.  The unions actually wanted to keep the government out of their business while in Europe the 
unions, especially in social democratic countries, had a very different approach – government and 
unions often worked together and cooperated in building welfare systems.   
Finally, the American constitution, even though it has been revised and amended, remains a 
document written by a minority of wealthy white men more than two centuries ago.  It reads very 
differently from the constitutions written more recently in Europe, the constitutional assembly of 
which shows a fairly open extensive representation of social and communist parties.  If you compare 
the American constitution to any European constitution, for example, or even the aborted new 
constitution for the European Union, you note a very different emphasis on defending private property 
versus ensuring social rights.  For instance, in the proposed European constitution I counted fifty-five 
social rights that should be guaranteed to every European citizen and there was only a minor reference 
to defending private property.  Constitutions do matter in influencing how institution and policy work.   
The third type of explanation, although harder to define in standard economic terms, has to do 
with something that we call behavioural or sociological-ideological factors.  The perception of poverty 
in the United States and in Europe is very different – this can be seen in casual observation and by 
looking at surveys.  Basically, and to make it slightly provocative, Americans believe that the poor are 
lazy and Europeans believe that the poor are unlucky.  There is a well-respected World Value Survey 
which has been undertaken since 1971 in about sixty countries around the world.  According to this 
survey, 69 per cent of Americans versus 29 per cent of Europeans believe that the poor could become 
rich if they tried hard enough.  Americans believe that the poor are poor because they don’t work hard 
and Europeans believe the poor are poor because society is unfair.  I actually remember when I was 
working on the above-mentioned book with my colleague, Ed Glaeser, in Washington at the Brookings 
Institution (Ed was on leave there) and we were taking an elevator with an African-American janitor.  
Ed and I were talking about this part of the book.  When one of us mentioned this particular statistic – 
the perception by Americans that the poor are lazy – this janitor stepped in and said, “Of course the 
poor are lazy – if they worked hard they could become rich.”  This was a janitor – I don’t think there is 
any janitor in Europe who would share this view.   5 
Using data from the World Value Survey one can easily see a positive correlation between the 
perception that poor people are trapped in poverty and the amount of social spending as a per cent of 
GDP.  That is, in countries where belief about the social determinants of poverty are stronger, social 
spending is higher.   
So the next question is: why do Americans and Europeans think differently?  There are a few 
potential explanations.  One is the Protestant ethic, namely, that Protestants and Calvinists view 
success almost as a religious sign of being chosen, and therefore economic success is viewed as 
something that everybody should strive for – that if you fail there is something “wrong” with you.  We 
actually looked at whether this perception of poverty is correlated with religion.  We considered 
whether American Protestants feel differently than American Catholics or American Jews about 
poverty.  We did not find any correlation, but there could be something more subtle than that:  even if 
you are a Catholic and you live in a country that is historically dominated by the Protestant ethic you 
change your attitude.  In any event, the data do not suggest much of a correlation between religious 
affiliation in the United States and the perception about poverty.   
Potentially a more important explanation is that of racial fragmentation.  I think it is a fact of 
life (perhaps unpleasant, but still a fact) that people of different races and of different ethnicities 
look at each other with some suspicion.  There is a lot of experimental evidence that shows that trust 
travels much faster and much better within the same race.  Of course there is racism, but even 
leaving racism aside, cooperation is easier within races than across races.  It follows that when 
differences in income are correlated with race, one may feel less generous in terms of welfare.  
There is a lot of evidence in the United States, for example, even controlling for income and other 
individual characteristics, that whites are less favourable to social spending than non-whites.  The 
interpretation is that white Americans feel that a lot of welfare spending goes to minorities and 
therefore they are less favourable than they would otherwise be in a more homogeneous society.  
Survey evidence shows, however, that whites overestimate the fraction of welfare expenditure that 
goes to minorities, that is, they underestimate the extent of poverty among whites. 
Incidentally, and this is an important point which I will return to before the end, to the extent that 
Western Europe is becoming more and more racially mixed because of immigration from Asia and 
North Africa and so on, I think that the same kind of social pressure that we see in the United States 
about the welfare state and racial mix will appear in Europe. 
Please note by the way, that the above does not mean that Americans are not generous.   
Donations to private charities per capita are much higher in the United States than in Europe.  One 
explanation is that Americans feel that by choosing a specific charity they reach the “deserving poor”, 
as opposed to the “generic poor”. 
The third argument is also a fascinating one – namely, the self-selection of immigrants.  After all, 
with the exception of the slaves, those who went to the United States went out of choice.  It is 
reasonable to assume that those immigrants who left Europe to go to the US were those who were 
more reliant upon themselves – they were prepared to try for their own individual fortune rather than 
stay home and possibly fight a revolution.  Perhaps those who went to the United States were those 
who had a culture of individualism.   
The fact that the United States, much more than any European country, is a melting pot of 
immigrants has a lot to do with the choice of social policies.  There is a very close link between one’s 
belief about society and one’s preference for redistribution.  If you believe that luck determines income 
or the other way around – that bad luck determines poverty – then automatically you’re prone to feel 
that these differences have to be corrected aggressively by the government.  If you think instead that 6 
individual ability and effort determines differences in income, then you are probably less aggressive in 
your view about the fact that these differences need to be corrected.  Detailed studies of survey 
evidence show that those who believe that society is fair – namely, that people get what they deserve 
through their effort and work ethic – believe that redistribution should be small while those who 
believe that society is unfair are those in favour of a more aggressive intervention of the government.   
In summary, why in Europe is the redistribution much larger and more aggressive than in the 
United States?  I think the answer is a combination of these historical, philosophical, sociological and 
political reasons all intermixed in the different histories of the two places.  The more you think about 
this the more you realize that the American and European perception of whether inequality is 
acceptable is very different on the two sides of the Atlantic.  Americans live in a more unequal society 
than Europe and are much less concerned about inequality, while Europeans are extremely concerned, 
almost obsessed I would say, about it.  It is enough to argue that any new policy that could potentially 
increase inequality would be a political loser in the European political debate.  In the United States 
inequality is instead increasing and, while there is concern about it, only the (far) left advocate strong 
measures to correct this trend. 
Now let me turn to the second question on which I will spend less time, namely, the differences 
between European welfare state models.  There is a standard classification that is debated in the 
literature between three or four types of systems – the Nordic system, the Anglo-Saxon system and the 
Continental and Mediterranean systems – which are sometimes separated but here will be kept 
together.  Of course the Nordic system is found in the Scandinavian countries, the Anglo-Saxon would 
be the American, United Kingdom, Australian, and New Zealand type of system and the Continental-
Mediterranean would be found in the others – France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  
The Nordic system is the most generous – they have the highest level of social protection, 
universal welfare provision and extensive fiscal intervention in the labour market.  But it is interesting 
actually to pause on this point because the Nordic countries, especially recently, have done what 
economists think is the right thing, namely, they have eliminated much of the existing firing costs and 
regulation in the labour and product markets that impede the smooth functioning of the markets and 
they have maintained generous unemployment compensation.  They made what I think is the right 
choice – mainly protecting people and not jobs – not preventing firms from firing people but protecting 
(at least temporarily) those who are fired.   
The Anglo-Saxon system that we already discussed is much less generous – social protection is 
the last resort.  It has lower unemployment subsidies, lower transfers and lower pensions.  However, 
tax rates are also much lower.  Thus, the disincentive effects of taxes are less prominent in these 
countries.  This system may be less egalitarian than the Nordic system, but at least it allows for free 
market function. 
Finally, the Continental and Mediterranean systems often concentrate on pensions and they have 
heavy intervention in the labour market with lots of regulations, such as very high firing costs.  These 
systems are considered to be the least efficient of the three.  In fact the Continental and Mediterranean 
welfare systems are the losers in this comparison because they are almost as expensive as the Nordic 
system but they are much less efficient in transferring resources from the truly rich to the truly poor, 
especially the Mediterranean system.  With their labour regulation, France, Germany, Italy and Spain 
create obstacles to employment and generate pockets of insiders that oppose labour market reform.  
These are older unionized workers who want to prevent labour turnover and generate obstacles of 
entry to new generations of young workers. 7 
At risk of poverty before and after social transfers 
  Before  After  Year 
Denmark..................... 31  11  2004 
France........................ 26  14  2004 
Germany .................... 24  16  2004 
Greece ....................... 20  20  2004 
Italy............................. 23  19  2004 
Netherlands................ 23  11  2002 
Norway....................... 26  11  2004 
Sweden...................... 30  11  2004 
United Kingdom .........  29  18  2003 
Source:  A. Alesina and F. Giavazzi, The Future of Europe (Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 
2006). 
The fact that the Continental and Mediterranean systems are the least well functioning is 
highlighted by some interesting data from the OECD.  These data show a comparison of risk of 
poverty before and after social transfer.  More precisely, these are the percentages of the population at 
risk of poverty before and after social transfer; the bigger the difference before and after social transfer 
the more successful a system is.  We go from a case like Greece where, at least according to this data, 
the social transfer does absolutely nothing at reducing poverty because there are as many people at risk 
of poverty before as there are after social transfers, to a system like that in Denmark and Sweden 
which is extremely efficient because there are a lot of people before transfer who are at risk of poverty 
but a very small number after transfer.  These data are unfortunately not available for the United 
States, but the United Kingdom does less well than the Nordic system in terms of reducing risk of 
poverty but is also much cheaper as the taxes are much lower.  Another example of a system that does 
not work well is the Italian system.  Even though tax rates in Italy are high and the welfare system in 
that country is quite expensive, it doesn’t transfer that much – it is not as bad as Greece but certainly is 
not particularly successful at moving a lot of resources from the very rich to the very poor.  In the case 
of Italy, which is a case I know more about than others, much of the problem is that Italian social 
spending is directed too much toward pensions in a way that often does not necessarily favour the truly 
poor. 
If it is true that the Nordic system is so successful then the question is: can it be easily exported to 
other countries in Western Europe or perhaps new democracies all over the world?  Unfortunately, the 
answer is not so clear.  First of all, this system is quite expensive.  For a country like Poland, to impose 
the kind of taxation needed to support the welfare system of Scandinavian countries may be quite 
“expensive”, i.e. the tax burden may significantly reduce growth.  A Nordic country may afford not to 
grow particularly fast or to bear the cost of high taxation but for a country that needs to catch up this 
level of taxation may be problematic.  In addition, traditionally social democratic countries in northern 
Europe are relatively small and homogenous, with a very high degree of social capital, social cohesion, 
low tax evasion and much social solidarity.  It may be very difficult to export this system to a country 
with a much lower degree of social trust like France, Greece, Italy or Spain.  Here is a revealing story.  8 
Someone I know employed a Danish part-time worker in the summer in Italy.  At some point instead 
of working 20 hours per week she started to work 30 hours per week for the family and she 
immediately called the Danish employment agency telling them that her subsidy had to be cut because 
she was working 10 hours more than planned.  I can’t think of another non-Nordic country where 
young employees would have done the same with their government – they probably would take the 
extra ten hours under the table and would certainly not have called the employment agency.   
This small example captures something important.  The Nordic countries are becoming the 
“heroes” of the European left because in the last few years they seem to have had very decent and 
quite sustained growth and a very generous welfare state.  I hate to throw cold water on this 
enthusiasm but for the reason just discussed a moment ago one has to be a little bit sceptical about how 
exportable the system is to the rest of Europe or Latin America or Central and Eastern Europe.  Also, 
we should not forget that the Nordic countries are on the rebound from fairly deep recessions in the 
1990s.  Whether the Nordic country system can easily be exportable is actually a very tricky issue. 
Let me go to the final issue I wanted to talk about, very briefly: what are the choices for Central 
and East European countries in terms of a welfare state?  The collapse of communism can generate 
two types of reactions in people regarding the role of government intervention.  One is to jump to the 
extreme – to take an ultra-liberal position – to really hate the state and be moved to the extreme of the 
super liberal state in a way that Milton Freedman would advocate.  Or, the other reaction is that people 
after many years of communism become used to a state that does everything.  Therefore even though 
they may embrace capitalism, they want a state that takes care of people from the moment they are 
born to the moment they die.   
I think it is fair to say that in a transition economy there are likely to be both of these reactions in 
different countries, and at different points in time there have been both types of reaction – even some 
movement from anti-state liberalism to a much more prostate anti-free market stance.  Some countries 
have oscillated up to now and different countries have taken different routes so we see a little bit of 
both extremes.  I did a study with a colleague of mine at Harvard, Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln, and we 
looked at a very interesting policy experiment offered by the reunification of Germany.  As you know 
Germany was separated in 1945 as a result of the Second World War – the separation being dependent 
upon bargaining between the allies and the Soviets.  As we economists say, it was a fairly exogenous 
decision imposed on the Germans.  The East Germans did not choose to become communists.  Even 
the demarcation of the border between East and West Germany is actually cut through pre-existing 
regions of Germany and so, for example, some Prussians ended up in the East, some Prussians ended 
up in the West.  The German reunification itself, from the German point of view, is also pretty much 
exogenous in the sense that it would not have happened without the collapse of the Soviet Union.   
To put it differently, the German example offers an especially “clear” case of testing the 
preferences of similar people, i.e. the Germans diverge, having lived for fifty years under different 
regimes. 
We use surveys taken first in West Germany and then again when East and West were reunified 
about the attitudes of people toward the state. We looked at several questions about what the state 
should do in terms of welfare and in particular there were four questions – whether the state should or 
should not have: responsibility for financial security when unemployed; responsibility for financial 
security when sick; responsibility for financial security of the family (which means transfers to poor 
families); and responsibility for the financial security of the old.  We have data from these surveys 
from 1997 and 2002, when the surveys were taken.  In 1997, as you can see, many more people in East 
Germany responded that they were strongly favourable to government intervention in these areas and 9 
Germany – areas for which the state should be responsible (survey percentages),  
1997 and 2002 




1997  Financial security when unemployed  63.24  78.85 
  Financial security when sick  34.50  52.76 
  Financial security of the family  32.78  49.06 
  Financial security when old  38.46  56.09 
      
2002  Financial security when unemployed  65.33  76.64 
  Financial security when sick  40.01  51.81 
  Financial security of the family  32.10  46.65 
  Financial security when old  36.70  48.51 
Source:  A. Alesina and N. Fuchs Schuendeln, Good bye Lenin (or not?): The Effect of 
Communism on People’s Preferences, NBER Working Paper, No. 11700 (Cambridge, MA), 
October 2005. 
when you compare 1997 to 2002 you see that the East Germans are becoming slightly less favourable 
to the state in 2002 relative to 1997.  Now these are just raw averages of the responses but if you do a 
pretty detailed statistical analysis, as we did, then you discover that indeed what happens is precisely 
what these raw numbers show – mainly that East Germans were much more pro-state than West 
Germans.   
This is especially the case for the older East Germans, and in fact you find the longer some lived 
under a communist regime in East Germany the more they were pro-state.  In most Western European 
countries in general people become more right wing and more against the state when they become 
older.  In East Germany, it is the opposite – the older you are the more pro-state you are.  The young 
East Germans, however, look much more like the young West Germans.  There we find some 
convergence – in 2002 East Germans looked more like West Germans in terms of their preference for 
state intervention; but a convergence is not that fast – namely, even fifteen or sixteen years after the 
reunification, the East Germans are still much more pro-government than the West Germans.  Also 
East Germans tend to vote more for leftist parties so the conclusion is that Germany may have actually 
received quite a large political shock from liberalization.   
As I mentioned before, the German case may not apply to every former communist country.  In 
fact, there might be a lot of oscillation from very much pro-state to very much anti-state.  But what are 
the realistic choices for former communist countries?  First of all, countries at this level of income 
cannot afford the Nordic-type welfare system.  We know that the size of government, and especially of 
social spending, is increasing with the level of per capita income.  Poorer countries need first to grow 
out of poverty and then can afford to collect the fiscal revenues to support an encompassing welfare 
state.  Even in the Nordic countries, high marginal tax rates cause economic distortions, which would 
be very damaging at lower levels of development.  If new democracies cannot afford a Nordic-style 
welfare system they may as well adopt a “lean and mean” Anglo-Saxon welfare-type system which is 
cheaper and does not have the inefficiencies of the Continental and Mediterranean systems.  We have 
shown above that Continental and Mediterranean welfare systems are at the same time expensive in 10 
terms of tax revenues needed and not very efficient at redistributing resources from the rich to the 
poor.  Their reliance on pensions is excessive and labour protection laws create major obstacles to the 
smooth functioning of labour markets. 
Let me conclude by adding some policy considerations.  Thus far I have tried to be as judgment 
free as possible in the sense that in the book and with the discussion today I have tried to make no 
judgment of whether the Americans are right and the Europeans are wrong or vice versa.  Here in this 
context let me make a few policy implications that perhaps more reflect my views.   
My view is that Western European countries, particularly those in the Continental and 
Mediterranean areas, have gone too far in social protection in ways which have created too many 
inefficiencies, in particular in the labour market, and have not created enough competition in the 
product market.  These welfare systems were introduced in a period after the Second World War when 
there was a great need for reducing the suffering of people.  During the economic boom of Europe in 
the 1960s the systems were made even more generous.  Since growth was high and things seemed to 
be going well, the pension systems were made too generous and labour laws were made quite 
intrusive; then the shock of the 1970s and 1980s made these welfare systems unsustainable because 
they reduced growth.  Together with changes in the life expectancy, the reduction and trend of growth 
created large burdens for these welfare systems.  As discussed, this is particularly true for the core of 
Europe – the large European countries of France, Germany, Italy and Spain – the Continental-
Mediterranean Europe.  I think that countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are developing post-
communist welfare systems should not make the same mistake.  They don’t have much choice other 
than adopting a lean welfare-type system in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.  Thank you. 
 